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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

SYNTHESIZING NARRATIVES OF POLICING AND MAKING A
CASE FOR POLICING AS A PUBLIC GOOD

TRACEY L. MEARES*
INTRODUCTION
Since 2014, in what I will call the “New Reform Era,” many discussions of
policing are dominated by two conceptions often juxtaposed against one another.
Probably the dominant conception of policing offered from police officers and
agencies is that it ought to be effective. By effective, they mean that policing’s
primary goal should be to reduce crime or prevent it. 1 Folks interested in the
project of police reform typically offer a different conception of the goal of
policing—one that emphasizes lawfulness. Reformers often describe lawfulness
in terms of commitments to constitutional law. 2 Of course, these two ideals need
not describe competing visions. Yet, when one looks to the scholarly literature
pertaining to these two topics, especially the criminological and legal literatures,
it is easy to see the ways in which they have been and are portrayed to be in
competition. In this short essay, I have two goals. First, I would like to offer an
explanation for the competition between the two conceptions and to recount
some earlier work in which I attempted to reconcile these two conceptions.
Second, I would like to integrate an increasingly prominent idea—abolition—

* Professor Tracey L. Meares, Walton Hale Hamilton Professor and Co-Faculty Founder of The
Justice Collaboratory at Yale Law School. This essay is an expanded (and footnoted) version of the
Richard J. Childress Memorial Lecture delivered at St. Louis University Law School on October 5,
2018.
1. Note, of course, that the prevention goal could be more far reaching than the way police
executives typically use that term with respect to what might be required from government to
intervene in terms of coordination for social supports. For a particular progressive example of this
approach, see MATTHEW WARD, W. MIDLANDS POLICE & CRIME COMM’R, STRATEGIC POLICING
& CRIME REPORT, Apr. 4, 2017, https://www.westmidlands-pcc.gov.uk/media/451199/07ii-SPCB04-April-17-Standing-Up-for-Young-People-Part-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XVL-S2Q4] (last
visited Mar. 13, 2019).
2. There is no reason why lawful policing is required to be circumscribed only by
constitutional law. There are many bodies of law that shape and regulate policing and could regulate
it even if they do not now. See Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1865 (2015) (discussing the value of state legislation to authorize and
constrain policing); Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 785–87,
803 (2011) (discussing various bodies of law that circumscribe policing including international
treaties, federal statutory law, state constitutions, statutes and regulations).
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into this discussion and offer some thoughts on the ways in which setting these
two ideals as oppositional complicates the possibility of abolitionist frameworks
as productive for police transformation. In the process, I hope to assist a more
general conversation about criminal justice reconceptualization.
I. POLICE EFFECTIVENESS V. POLICE LAWFULNESS
Begin with the idea of policing effectiveness. Being effective at crime
reduction is congruent with how police agents think of themselves. If you ask a
police officer what policing is for, he or she is likely to say, “The job of the
police is to keep the public safe.” Many, including the police themselves, take
that statement to mean that police ought to be effective “crime fighters.” 3 This
conception of policing has led to many negative consequences in terms of police
management of the organization, 4 workplace conditions for officers, 5 and strife
between agencies and the communities they serve. 6
Lawfulness is another way in which scholars, policy-makers, and
practitioners judge the good in policing. Of course, police as upholders of the
law could be considered just an aspect of the police effectiveness vision of
policing, but usually those who demand police lawfulness are not talking about
police enforcing the criminal laws that a polity has adopted. Rather, they are
more typically talking about police commitments to lawfulness, in word or deed,
when carrying out the tasks of enforcing criminal law such as adherence to
constitutional law, to police procedures or to other relevant state and municipal
law.
3. See Ronald van Steden et al., Overlapping Values, Mutual Prejudices Empirical Research
into the Ethos of Police Officers and Private Security Guards, 47 ADMIN. & SOC’Y. 220, 242–43
(2015); but see FORREST STUART, DOWN, OUT, AND UNDER ARREST: POLICING AND EVERYDAY
LIFE IN SKID ROW (2016).
4. See Malcolm K. Sparrow, Measuring Performance in a Modern Police Organization, 3
PSYCHOSOCIOLOGICAL ISSUES HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 1, 4–5 (2015) (offering the brilliant
metaphor that running a policing agency is at least as difficult as flying a Boeing 767 and yet no
one would fly a plane with reference to one gauge—altitude—but instead a pilot wants to know
something about speed, pitch, yaw, roll and pressure, not to mention measures of conditions both
outside of and inside of the plane).
5. See Saki Knafo, A Black Police Officer’s Fight Against the N.Y.P.D., N. Y. TIMES, Feb.
18, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/21/magazine/a-black-police-officers-fight-againstthe-nypd.html [https://perma.cc/7H46-SYFU] (last visited Oct. 27, 2018); Linda Duxbury &
Michael Halinski, It’s not all about guns and gangs: role overload as a source of stress for male
and female police officers, 28 POLICING & SOC’Y. 930, 931 (2018); Akiva M. Liberman et al.,
Routine Occupational Stress and Psychological Distress in Police, 25 POLICING INT. J. POLICE
STRATEGIES & MGMT. 421, 423, 432 (2002).
6. See Tracey L. Meares, The Path Forward: Improving the Dynamics of Police-Community
Relationships to Achieve Effective Law Enforcement Policies, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1355, 1361–
62, 1364–66 (2017); Tom R. Tyler et al., Street Stops and Police Legitimacy: Teachable Moments
in Young Urban Men’s Legal Socialization, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 751, 751–52, 757, 771,
776 (2014).
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Constitutional law looms large here for many reasons. One is about legal
socialization. Lay understandings of legality and the role of legal regulation is
often associated with references to constitutionality. 7 Here is a quick example to
motivate the insight regarding everyday legal socialization: Has any one of you
ever experienced a conversation with a child in which the child says, “I refuse
to tell you what happened because it might incriminate me,” or, “I have a First
Amendment right to speak in this house?” In either case, it does not make much
sense to say to the child that your house is not the state because from their
perspective, it is. A second reason has to do with the reality of police regulation
in this country. Unlike the U.K., the U.S. does not have an auditing body at the
federal level that ensures the comportment of policing agencies of generally
applicable legislation. 8 Instead, in the U.S., the federal government intervenes
into the operation of state and municipal criminal justice agencies only in cases
of constitutional violation, and even then, only when violations at the agency
level are pervasive and systematic (and then only when the political agenda of
the Attorney General is in alignment with such an intervention). 9 The bottom
line is that relegating police lawfulness to alignment with constitutional law is a
very weak notion of police lawfulness.
While I have set lawfulness and effectiveness in opposition to one another,
let us dispense at the outset with the idea that these two notions must inevitably
collide. My claim is a positive and not a normative one in that I observe in the
world that these two ideas often are pitted against one another. One need only
read pronouncements from former Attorney General Jeff Sessions to see this
point, 10 but, and much more seriously, one can also observe the opposition in
the scholarly literature on policing.
The conventional wisdom, at least from the 1960s until the mid-1990s in the
United States, was that police had very little impact on crime rates following the
1967 ground-breaking report of the President’s Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice: The Challenge of Crime in a Free
7. See, e,g., Laura Beth Nielsen, Situating Legal Consciousness: Experiences and Attitudes
of Ordinary Citizens about Law and Street Harassment, 34 L. SOC. REV. 1055, 1074, 1087–88
(2000) (discussing regulation of public speech); see generally PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S.
SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998).
8. Tim Newburn, ”Tough on Crime”: Penal Policy in England and Wales, 36 CRIME & JUST.
425, 449 (2007) (stating that “a dedicated unit was created within the Home Office in 2003 to
promote local activism, and considerable further legislation (the Criminal Justice and Court
Services Act 2000, the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, the Police Reform Act 2002, and, in
particular, the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003) has added a raft of additional powers that the
authorities have been encouraged to use vigorously.”).
9. See Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute 42 U.S.C. § 14141, (2012).
10. Trump Administration to Oppose Chicago Police Reform Plan: Sessions, REUTERS,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-police-chicago/trump-administration-to-oppose-chicagopolice-reform-plan-sessions-idUSKCN1MK03Z [https://perma.cc/N379-BBGW] (last visited Oct.
27, 2018).
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Society, 11 which detailed the relationship between so-called root causes and
crime. Thought leaders at the vanguard of the professionalism era in policing
thought that police should focus on other tasks such as bringing offenders to
justice regardless of whether such work affected the crime rate, or peacekeeping
tasks such as intervening in domestic disputes, or providing help and assistance
to those in need, or even traffic control. Note that none of these roles casts police
officers in the now prevailing image of crime fighters in a war against crime—
and the militaristic consequences of that imagery. But scholars, notably James
Q. Wilson, pushed policing executives and scholars to think of policing
differently and, in particular, to make crime reduction a primary goal of
policing. 12 Empirical work devoted to demonstrating connections between
policing strategies and crime followed. 13 The criminological research supporting
police effectiveness at crime reduction, with its focus on the econometrics of
tactics and strategies to reduce crime, has largely ignored the lawfulness or
unlawfulness of the police action to achieve crime reduction. One might
occasionally find a rare social scientist who points to police lawbreaking as a
potential “cost” to balance against the “benefit” of crime-reducing policing. 14
But for the most part, social scientists hone in on one outcome of police strategy
and tactics—the texts to which various approaches do or do not impact crime—
without thinking about other impacts. This empirical approach presumes that
policing takes place lawfully.
The myopia of the empirics camp allowed scholars concerned with the
lawfulness of police action to write as if police effectiveness largely was
irrelevant to their own work. Consider the words of Judge Shira Scheindlin, the
trial judge who presided over the New York City Stop, Question and Frisk case,
Floyd et al v. New York City. 15 In her Floyd opinion, Judge Scheindlin cabined
off the relevance of law enforcement effectiveness from her assessment of the
constitutional violations in question. When the defendants attempted to present
evidence on the effectiveness of Stop, Question and Frisk in reducing crime in
New York City, the judge refused to allow it, stating, “[T]his case is not about
the effectiveness of stop and frisk in deterring or combating crime. This Court’s
11. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME
96, 169, 248, 262, 273–275, 280, 302 (1968).
12. See James Q. Wilson & Barbara Boland, The Effect of the Police on Crime, 12 LAW &
SOC’Y. REV. 367, 383 (1978) (first scholarly article urging police to use “Terry” stops as a method
to crime reduction); James Q. Wilson & Barbara Boland, The Effects of the Police on Crime: A
Response to Jacob and Rich, 16 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 163, 169 (1981); Robert J. Sampson &
Jacqueline Cohen, Deterrent Effects of the Police on Crime: A Replication and Theoretical
Extension, 22 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 163, 166, 182 (1988).
13. See Tracey L. Meares, The Law and Social Science of Stop and Frisk, 10 ANN. REV. L. &
SOC. SCI. 335, 348–49 (2014).
14. See, e.g., Ralph B. Taylor & Brian A. Lawton, An integrated contextual model of
confidence in local police, 15 POLICE Q. 414, 432 (2012).
15. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

IN A FREE SOCIETY 17, 25, 35–36, 40, 57,
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mandate is solely to judge the constitutionality of police behaviour, not its
effectiveness as a law . . . ‘The enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily
takes certain policy choices off the table.’” 16
According to this view, requiring police to adhere to rules that limit their
discretion always results in more liberty for individuals. If there is more crime
that results from constraints on police discretion, then that consequence is simply
a price we pay for more freedom in society. Note that this view ignores the
possibility that living a life with lower levels of crime—especially violent
crime—could also be freedom enhancing. 17 In a world in which we think police
play some role in the production of public safety and also believe that their role
should importantly be constrained by legal dictates, the idea that lawfulness
should always come at the cost of increased safety or vice versa is a serious
problem. Such a framework suggests that simultaneous attention to lawfulness
and effectiveness is impossible.
In other work, I have outlined a vision of policing that is attentive to both
lawfulness and effectiveness on behalf of police, but also captures important
dimensions of police activities relevant to compliance by lay people. 18 I have
argued that grounding policing in public legitimacy rather than deterrence and
utilizing the social psychological concept of legitimacy as an organizing
principle for police work (rather than crime fighting) makes room for police
effectiveness at crime reduction as well as making salient practices that
communities care about. 19 Attention to the procedural justice of policing
problematizes the ease with which policing organizations can point to public
safety (defined as police activities designed to reduce crime) as the primary
justification for their existence and behaviors.
The body of work on procedural justice also underscores the way in which
focusing only on lawfulness of police behavior—especially lawfulness
expressed solely in constitutional terms—can miss important factors that the
public cares about when evaluating police. More specifically, constitutional law,
the primary code of police regulation, does not emphasize the importance of
quality of police treatment and does not discuss the impact of police work upon
dignity, identity, or status—all of which are key aspects of procedural justice.
This is not to say that constitutional (or other) law could focus on these things.
Importantly, though, constitutional law does not focus on these things. The
16. Id. at 556 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008)).
17. See PATRICK SHARKEY, UNEASY PEACE: THE GREAT CRIME DECLINE, THE RENEWAL OF
CITY LIFE, AND THE NEXT WAR ON VIOLENCE xviii–xix (1 edition ed. 2018) (explaining the
benefits formerly high crime communities enjoy when violent crime decreases).
18. See Tracey L. Meares, Policing in the 21st Century: The Importance of Public Security
Policing the Police: Keynote Address, 2016 UNIV. CHI. LEGAL F. 1–12 (2016); Tracey L. Meares,
Good Cop: Knowing the Difference between Lawful or Effective Policing and Rightful Policing—
And Why It Matters 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1865, 1875 (2012).
19. See id.
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jurisprudence of constitutional policing, especially as prescribed by the Fourth
Amendment, is focused on the justifications for an officer’s actions when
deciding whether to interact with someone as opposed to addressing the quality
of the police officer’s treatment of an individual and how that treatment impacts
a person’s dignity, identity, or status. Tom Tyler, Jacob Gardner, and I have
conducted a study in which we show that when lay people evaluate police
behavior they tend to focus on factors that comprise the four components of
procedural justice as opposed to aspects of constitutionality. 20 This does not
mean that people do not care about legality; rather, we show that people’s
understandings of the legality of police behavior is filtered through their
perceptions of the procedural justice of police action. 21
Critics of the procedural justice focused notion of legitimacy have worried
about how policing organizations use the research. Their arguments take various
forms, but their common root suggests that because procedural justice is focused
on the public’s perception of legal authorities, those authorities may engage in
strategies to enhance perception without really changing the substance of what
they do or the ways they think about the people they police. In short, a focus on
legitimacy might lead to fake police behavior. 22 Another worry is that agencies
simply do not have the capacity to reach the goals that the theory specifies, and,
since police are an armed and often present danger to those with whom they
interact, it is risky to wait until things get better. Advocates of this view urge us
to “reduce the footprint of police.” 23 Their concerns taken together are, I think,
an entry point to discuss abolition.
II. THE PRODUCTIVITY OF ABOLITIONIST FRAMEWORKS FOR POLICE
TRANSFORMATION
In an essay for the Boston Review published about a year ago, I argued that
police must be abolished before policing can be transformed. 24 In the essay, I
argue that critics of police abolition caricature the abolitionists’ view when they
assume that police abolition simply means no police. That attack is unsurprising
given that it comes from those who are committed to the notion that crime
reduction by police is self-justifying—an approach too many effectiveness

20. See Tracey L. Meares et. al., Lawful Or Fair? How Cops and Laypeople Perceive Good
Policing Criminal Law, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 297, 324 (2015).
21. See id. at 332.
22. See PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 197, 198 (2017).
23. See Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement Essay,
126 YALE L. J. 2054, 2149 (2016).
24. Tracy Meares, Policing: A Public Good Gone Bad, BOS. REV., Aug. 1, 2017,
https://bostonreview.net/law-justice/tracey-l-meares-policing-public-good-gone-bad
[https://perma.cc/X2TU-GDEE] (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
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proponents take. This argument is a straw man. 25 Obviously, residents of cities
such as Chicago, Milwaukee, or Baltimore (where I serve on the Consent Decree
Monitoring Team) are struggling with unacceptably high levels of violence and
care about reducing it. In Chicago, for example, protests against police violence
shut down Lake Shore Drive, and protests against the failure of city government
to address high levels of violence in some neighborhoods also shut down the
Dan Ryan Expressway, which is the main city highway running south through
Chicago. 26 In my Boston Review essay I quote Mariame Kaba, “For me prison
abolition is two things: It’s the complete and utter dismantling of prison and
policing and surveillance as they currently exist within our culture. And it’s also
the building up of new ways of intersecting and new ways of relating with each
other.” 27
Of course, residents of the cities I just named, and many more, care about
being safe—from each other and from police excess. Reducing the footprint of
policing is an obvious solution to the latter problem, but it is not clear that it
addresses the former.
A great deal of the energy around criminal justice abolition is
understandably focused on the dismantling of criminal justice institutions. There
is a lot of too much within policing—too much stopping, too much frisking, too
much police attention to low-level violations, and too many activities classified
as violations. 28 And there is too much police violence against citizens in too
many places. All of this is true even granting the great success of the crime
decline we have seen over the last few decades in which policing has no doubt
played a role. 29 The worry is that a focus on dismantling without a theory of the
goal of building up puts us at risk of just reduction of the bad, which is
something—something incredibly important—but it’s not enough.
Reduction of the bad is more humane, but it’s not a citizenship project. And
I believe abolition is fundamentally a citizenship project.
My friend and colleague, Paul Butler, is working on a new project on
abolition. The project involves applying criminal law concepts to
25. Dan Berger, What Abolitionists Do, JACOBIN, Aug. 24, 2017, http://jacobinmag.com/
2017/08/prison-abolition-reform-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/NCM8-U4Y7] (last visited
Oct. 27, 2018).
26. Todd Lighty, Police arrest anti-violence protesters trying to march on Kennedy
Expressway near O’Hare, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 3, 2018, https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ctmetkennedy-expressway-protest-chicago-20180904-story.html [https://perma.cc/V3C6-DVZA] (last
visited Jan. 18, 2019).
27. Meares, supra note 24.
28. Stephen Carter, Law Puts Us All in Same Danger as Eric Garner, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 4,
2014 https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2014-12-04/law-puts-us-all-in-same-dangeras-eric-garner [https://perma.cc/63GP-NBCG] (last visited Oct. 28, 2018) (On this last point,
consider my colleague, Stephen Carter’s admonition to his students, “Never to support a law you
are not willing to kill to enforce”).
29. SHARKEY, supra note 17.
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understandings of abolition. In describing the paper at a recent conference, Paul
made a very important statement drawing on the great W.E.B. DuBois when he
said something like abolition of slavery was never just about abolishing the legal
category of enslaved people, it was also about the project of establishing
citizenship for the formerly enslaved. 30 That is about dismantling, yes, but it is
also about building up.
My argument is that policing is a project of citizenship and that
conceptualizing it and carrying it out as a public good makes citizenship real. I
wrote in the Boston Review,
When the public at large experiences the ‘good’ of policing only by
concentrating the costs of producing that good on a small group—such as black
people, and particularly black men—it is hard to say that the good is ‘good’ or
even truly public. We need to create a kind of policing that we all can enjoy. 31

Police transformation requires deep thinking about what it means to say that
a public good is both public and good. History looms large in this effort. It has
become increasingly common to point out the roots of American policing in
nineteenth century slave patrols, and there are racial through-lines from
enforcement of Jim Crow to today’s mass imprisonment of African
Americans. 32 It is also important to note historical and contemporary
connections between policing and immigration control 33 as well as regulation of
sexuality and gender presentation. 34 It is clear that a necessary first step to
redeeming this public good is to find a new symbolic language for thinking about
its role in society.
This is particularly crucial with regard to the role that police play in
generating our understanding of ourselves as citizens given that police have
served to enforce strict limits on who could enjoy the rights of citizenship. Police
30. See W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, Reconstruction and its Benefits, 15 AM. HIST. REV. 781,
788 (1910) (In which DuBois made the then controversial argument regarding the benefits of
Reconstruction to the American Historical Association against the prevailing Dunning School,
which promoted the idea that Reconstruction was a failure. He was roundly repudiated, and no
African American was invited to speak to the AHA again until 1940. Today, of course, many of
DuBois’s insights are taken for granted).
31. Meares, supra note 24.
32. Hubert Williams & Patrick V. Murphy, Evolving Strategy of Police: A Minority View, U.S.
DEPT. JUST., https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/121019.pdf [https://perma.cc/26Y7-VYFV] (last
visited Jan. 18, 2019); Legal Scholar: Jim Crow Still Exists in America, NPR, Jan. 16, 2012,
https://www.npr.org/2012/01/16/145175694/legal-scholar-jim-crow-still-exists-in-america
[https://perma.cc/5XS9-VX56] (last visited Jan. 28, 2019).
33. See KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME,
AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA 4 (2010).
34. See Leslie J. Moran & Andrew N. Sharpe, Violence, identity and policing: The Case of
violence against transgender people, 4 CRIM. JUST. 395, 396 (2004); ANDREA J. RITCHIE ET AL.,
INVISIBLE NO MORE: POLICE VIOLENCE AGAINST BLACK WOMEN AND WOMEN OF COLOR ix,
xiv–xv, 127 (2017).
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officers are state authorities who play a critical role in helping people to decipher
their environment and where they fit in society. Criminologist Ian Loader and
sociologist Aogán Mulcahy put it this way:
[Police are] an interpretive lens through which people make sense of, and give
order to, their world . . . a vehicle that enables individuals and groups to make
sense of their past, form judgments on the present, and project various imagined
futures. As an institution intimately concerned with the viability of the state . . .
policing remains closely tied to the maintenance of ontological security, the
production of subjectivities, and the articulation of collective identities.

The project of coming up with this symbolic language for police
transformation is a task we all must engage in together. It is a necessary part of
the building up, and we must do it while we are engaged in the task of
dismantling what we do now. And this process deserves theory. To make the
argument more concrete, consider political theorist Bonnie Honig’s recent essay
entitled, Public Things. 35 Honig makes an argument about the importance of
“pursuing in common objects of common desires.” In the essay she is primarily
concerned with the dangers of privatization, but the thrust of her argument is
relevant to our work. Her worry is that by theorizing only about the demos—
constitutions, proper procedures, commitments to formal equality, boundaries—
the subjects of democracy, we lose sight of the objects of democracy.
The idea of a public thing prefigures a public good. We have to be
committed to the public thing before we can work on symbolic language that
creates the good. As Honig says, “Being shared or public means that they are
sites of confrontation and encounter, enjoyment and conflict, and they are
accessible to all.” 36 As Honig and others note, 37 privatization undermines the
public good, but I believe that narratives that cannot see the possibility of
reconciling the possibility of assisting a community’s residents in the task of
addressing private predation while being scrupulously attentive to the dictates
of the law also undermine our ability to work on the public good. The
impossibility of reconciling these two ideas necessarily leads to the notion that
it is better for the state to step back from what I believe to be its obligation to
help citizens in the project of security.
The path to public security—the place where people can feel safe from both
private predation and state excess—emphasizes the centrality of law to the
police officer’s task, not only in the sense that a police officer must carry out her
duties lawfully, but also in the sense that a police officer ought to understand
herself as a legal authority. As legal authorities, police officers play a critical

35. Bonnie Honig, Public Things: Jonathan Lear’s Radical Hope, Lars von Trier’s
Melancholia, and the Democratic Need, 68 POL. RES. Q. 623, 624 (2015).
36. Id.
37. Ian Loader & Neil Walker, Policing as a Public Good: Reconstituting the Connections
between Policing and the State, 5 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 9, 25 (2001).
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role in conveying important information to members of the public about their
role and status as citizens. The relationship that members of the public have with
legal authorities is foundational to their understanding of themselves as
citizens. 38 I want to suggest that a critical step in making policing a public thing
is a commitment to thinking through not only how the work of policing is carried
out, but also, and more importantly, in how it is structured and made accountable
to the people the agency serves. And with a great deal of work, attention to
history and acknowledgement of past and current wrongdoing, policing can
become a public good.
The operational question is important here. How do we motivate this theory
to make it real on the ground? Here are two points:
First, I think the theory of procedural justice is complimentary to Honig’s
discussion of public things. Procedural justice provides a way of understanding
how the public things can be sites of what she calls “contestation and encounter.”
Our processes of creating and re-creating public things must be attentive to the
ways in which the public comes to conclusions about fairness. Procedural justice
provides a roadmap. 39
Second, current theorizing about public goods is helpful, but often
unnecessarily restrictive in that conceptions focus on the problems of
privatization—Honig is no exception. 40 Theorists occupy the political
spectrum. 41 Eli Lehrer, President of the R Street Institute, argues that public
goods contribute to a sense of “national cohesion.” 42 I understand him to be
arguing in favor of robust support for infrastructure broadly conceived. We
probably agree on little else—in particular I disagree with his idea that public
goods are inconsistent with and in opposition to social insurance spending
because social insurance spending is supportive of a politics of rights while
public good spending is not— 43 but this is a start.

38. Benjamin Justice & Tracey L. Meares, How the Criminal Justice System Educates
Citizens, 651 ANNALS. AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 159, 160 (2014).
39. Meares, supra note 6.
40. MICHAEL HARDT ET AL., THE PRESIDENT’S HOUSE IS EMPTY: LOSING AND GAINING
PUBLIC GOODS (2017).
41. Eli Lehrer, A Politics of Public Goods, NAT’L AFFAIRS, https://www.nationalaffairs.com/
publications/detail/a-politics-of-public-goods [https://perma.cc/2QKM-JSHE] (last visited Nov. 1,
2018).
42. Id.
43. A short rant: Lehrer’s argument that Americans generally do love to help the poor has
been patently falsified once we consider race. It has been racism that has driven both the decline in
public trust and the switch from public goods to social insurance. The movement of black people
into public spaces (public education, for example) has led conservatives to champion vouchers,
charters, and “choice” while also vilifying “big government” overreach. I am also concerned that
Lehrer does not view education as a public good (big tipoff). Any race blind approach is probably
absurd given the fact that American politics clearly are aligned along racial lines on the questions
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CONCLUSION
This conference was conceived, I think, as a step in the project of working
toward a new model of shaping public good for the citizens of St. Louis forged
from tragedy. As this work continues, I hope the organizers, participants, and
residents of this City continue to seriously heed the call of “Moving Forward
Through Ferguson,” because that work provides a critical foundation for us all
to move forward.

that matter here. But I do agree with Lehrer that public goods are really healthy. If you can remove
racism, we are all conservatives.
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